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Australian Auditors-General Involvement in Probity Auditing: Evidence and 
Implications 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Probity audits, real time audits which review compliance with process and conformance 
with guidelines, are gaining popularity in the Australian public sector. Prior research has 
noted that the conduct of probity audits by auditors-general may pose problems for their 
independence. This paper provides empirical evidence on the extent to which probity 
audits are performed by Auditors-General in Australia, and the perceptions of auditors-
general to any dilemmas posed. The study finds that approximately half of the auditors-
general conduct probity audits, and that 'independence' is a key concern for those who 
don't perform these tasks. This indepth study of probity audits contributes to an 
understanding of the changing nature of public sector audit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The work of Australian Auditors-General1 has always been considered to be an essential 
part of the accountability chain between the executive, agencies, Parliament and 
taxpayers (Funnell, 1997). Until the 1970s, prior to the major public sector reforms, the 
main task of Australian Audit Offices was to undertake financial statement audits which 
concentrated on the verification of the information contained in the financial statements 
of agencies (Guthrie, 1987). However, as the nature of public sector activities changed, 
the limited focus of financial statement audits was seen as incompatible with the growing 
demands and financial pressures on government (Funnell, 1997). Audit offices responded 
by pressing for an expansion of their mandate. It was argued that providing state audit 
offices with the mandate to conduct performance audits would ensure the audit function 
remained relevant to the changing needs of the public sector. The audit function would 
thus provide independent advice to Parliament which augmented existing accountability 
mechanisms (Hamburger, 1989). Most Audit Offices in Australia have received a 
mandate to carry out efficiency or performance audits.2 Performance audits are 
concerned with the assessment of the management and operational performance of 
departments and agencies in using financial, staffing and other resources; their 
information systems; monitoring arrangements; and the procedures followed by agencies 
for remedying identified deficiencies.   Performance audits consider questions of 
economy, efficiency and cost/administrative effectiveness of the operations for which 
management is responsible (Guthrie, 1987). That theme of the continuing relevance of 
the public sector audit function, or 'value adding' is one which still exercises the minds of 
auditors-general today (Barrett, 1996) 
 
The continuation of public sector reform through the 1980s and into the 1990s saw the 
promotion of policies such as the endorsement of purchaser/provider splits, the 
privatisation of some public sector agencies, and the contracting out of service provision 
                                                 
1 Australia has nine Auditors-General, one for each state jurisdiction and one for the Commonwealth. 
2 The exception to this is the Queensland Audit Office and the Audit Office of the Northern Territory. 
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(Mulgan, 1997). These policies, and in particular, privatisation and the contracting out of 
services to the private sector, have confronted parliaments and auditors-general with a 
new set of accountability challenges (English and Guthrie, 2000a,b; Funnell, 2000). As 
arrangements governing service provision become more complex, it is crucial to establish 
workable audit mechanisms that satisfy public accountability concerns (Mulgan, 2000).  
 
Probity audits are a new type of audit gaining popularity in the public sector. They have 
become more common with the increasing number of government privatisations and 
contracting out of projects and services in the sector.  Probity audits are essentially 
independent reviews of compliance with process and conformance with existing public 
sector guidelines, to ascertain whether procedures followed are consistent with those 
regulations, guidelines and best practice principles of openness and transparency (ICAC, 
1996).  While the probity auditor is concerned to ensure that proper processes and 
procedures are followed, they do not become involved in the actual decision making. In 
recent times probity audits have been used by Australian public sector agencies as a 
means of demonstrating open and accountable government processes, and ensuring 
taxpayers receive value for money (Ng and Ryan, 2001).  
 
Prior empirical research has demonstrated that there is ambiguity surrounding the 
meaning of the term 'probity audit' (Ng and Ryan, 2001). ICAC (1996) argues that a 
decision to conduct a probity audit should ideally be made prior to the particular event 
occurring. While there are circumstances where it may be appropriate for an independent 
review to be carried out after the event to ensure proper functioning of activities within 
an agency, it is commonly agreed that this post-event audit is not classified as a probity 
audit (Ng and Ryan, 2001).3 As the term ‘probity audit’ has evolved it has come to mean 
“real time” audits, as opposed to “after the event” audits which are more in the review 
line (Ng and Ryan, 2001).  "Real time audits" mean that the audit is requested by a 
particular agency, they will pay the audit costs involved, and the terms of the audit 
engagement will be negotiated between the auditee who is the client and the auditor. The 
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term ‘probity audit’ will be used in this “real time” context in this paper. 
 
Prior research into the practice of probity audits in the public sector in Australia is scant.  
One study has used data available from one jurisdiction to examine the frequency of use, 
the circumstances in which they are used, who conducts probity audits and the costs of 
audits (Ng and Ryan, 2001).   This research has found that the conduct of probity audits 
appears to be relatively widespread; with over one half of the agencies surveyed in this 
one jurisdiction conducting a probity audit in the four-year period. In addition, 9% of the 
total audits conducted in that one jurisdiction under study, were performed by the 
Auditor-General.  The conduct of real time probity audits as opposed to ex-post financial 
statement audits and performance audits has the potential to pose dilemmas for auditors-
general. They raise the problem of the 'perceived' independence of the audit office if the 
office later finds itself in a situation of having to audit some aspect of the process which 
they helped to set up (Ng and Ryan, 2001). Further, unlike financial statement audits and 
performance audits where the Parliament is the client and consequently results of audits 
are reported to Parliament, the public sector agency usually engages the probity auditor 
and hence results are reported to that agency. The dilemmas posed by probity audits, and 
the contemporary relevance of this topic is evidenced by the fact that the conduct of 
probity audits was considered as a major item of discussion at the regular meeting of 
Auditors-General at the Australasian Council of Auditors-General (ACAG) in June, 
1998.  Opinions on the support for such services were divided, with some audit offices 
supporting involvement in these services while others were opposed. The ACAG decided 
that probity audits could be conducted by an auditor-general if they were done for the 
Parliament. However, decisions of ACAG are not binding on its members. 
 
In spite of the increasing interest in probity processes, there is no systematic evidence on 
the conduct of probity audits by Auditors-General throughout Australia, nor on how they 
deal with the dilemmas posed by these audits. This paper responds to these issues, by 
providing empirical evidence on the conduct of probity audits by Australian Auditors-
                                                                                                                                                 
3 As an example see the ANAO report No 42 "Magnetic Resonance Imaging Services-Effectiveness and 
Probity of the Policy Development Process and Implementation" (ANAO, 1999-00) which was carried out 
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General. The research has two objectives. The first objective is to provide empirical 
evidence on the extent to which probity audits are conducted by Australian Auditors-
General. The second objective is to detail and analyse how individual Auditors-General 
have responded to the dilemmas posed by this function. 
 
Auditors-General in Australia, can largely determine their own mandate and have always 
strived to place themselves in the forefront of public accountability and provide a pivotal 
role from Parliament to the community (Barrett, 1996). Successive auditors-general in 
both the Commonwealth and states and territories have fought for a mandate that 
effectively fulfills those accountability obligations and gives the public confidence in the 
activities of government agencies. Probity audits have a strong emphasis on assurance 
particularly about the management and use of taxpayers’ money (Barrett, 1996). The 
manner in which the auditors-general have responded to the changing processes of new 
public management – especially with respect to the contracting out of services is of 
current interest. An in-depth examination of the probity audits conducted by Australian 
Auditors-General will contribute to an understanding of the changing nature of public 
sector audit.   
 
The paper is organised as follows.  The next section examines the relevant literature, and 
the method is then discussed.  The results are analysed in the fourth section, and the 
conclusions and policy implications of the involvement of  auditors-general in probity 
auditing is discussed. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE-KEY CONCERNS FOR 
AUDITORS-GENERAL 
 
Any discussion about auditors-general essentially boils down to two themes –
accountability and independence (Barrett, 1996).  Notions of accountability have been 
debated and discussed in the public sector context at length.  The picture is one that is 
complex, contradictory and confusing (Parker and Gould, 1999).  The notion of 
                                                                                                                                                 
after the event. 
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accountability is continually being socially constructed (Sinclair, 1995).  It is however, 
generally agreed that the public sector has more forms of accountability than the private 
sector (Mulgan, 2000; Funnel, 1997).  Traditional notions of public sector accountability 
included such concepts as: parliamentary accountability; ministerial and electoral 
accountability and financial accountability (Thynne and Goldring, 1987; Cochrane, 1993; 
Wanna et al., 1999).  More recently, researchers have identified such forms of 
accountability as, political accountability, managerial accountability, professional 
accountability, personal accountability and public accountability (Sinclair, 1995; Glynn 
and Perkins, 1997).   
 
Public accountability was formally associated with political accountability but now 
involves the more direct accountability for the impact of policies upon the community 
(Glynn and Perkins, 1997).  Normanton (1971, p312) argues that accountability is an old 
device and it often "operates in secret".  Public accountability, on the other hand, "calls 
for openly declared facts and open debate of them" by both members of the community 
and their elected representatives.  It is "a rich and open source of knowledge about how 
government sources function in practice". Evans (1999) argues that public accountability 
consists of public exposure of matters that affect the public’s perception of government. 
Conventionally, the state auditor plays a pivotal role in the open declaration of facts and 
thereby facilitating open debate. One of the key criterion in this 'watchdog' role is that the 
public has confidence in the institution. Auditors-general have generally ensured this 
public confidence both by the establishment of clear and unambiguous lines of reporting 
to Parliament and by zealously guarding their independence.  
 
The independence of the auditor-general is the most crucially important auditing tenet 
(United Nations, 1987). With every inquiry into public sector audit, auditors-general have 
become more tense and strident in their defence of the office and the functions of the 
public sector auditor, and in particular the maintenance of the independence of the 
auditor-general (Funnell, 1997).  Independence is an elusive term with many and varying 
facets. There has been considerable evolution in the concept of independence and 
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substantial scope for any auditor-general to bring their own interpretation to the 
operational meaning of the term (Wanna et al., forthcoming).  
 
Various facets of independence have been examined in the literature. The ASCPA  
(1994) identified independence for auditors-general  as being comprised of two elements; 
personal independence and freedom from investigation and reporting. The JCPA (1996) 
talks about functional independence and regards it as being comprised of: personal 
independence; a wide legislative mandate; unrestricted access to information; adequate 
resourcing and freedom to determine the scope of the audit.  Others consider 
independence to comprise both personal and operational independence from the 
executive (see Funnell, 1997). Debate has also taken place on various aspects in relation 
to independence: structure of the office; resourcing; the ability to determine mandate; and 
access to information (English and Guthrie, 2000b; JCPA, 1989; JCPA, 1996). However, 
whichever slice of the concept is taken, it is agreed that independence is essential to the 
credibility and effectiveness of an audit (Funnell, 1997; Wanna et al, forthcoming). 
Moreover, "independence in  public sector audit is not merely a type or subset of private 
sector audit but represents a distinct and separate category" (Funnell, 1997). 
 
The major difference between private and public sector audit to this point in time is the 
relationship between the auditor, auditee and client. In the public sector, these 
relationships are in sharp relief (English and Guthrie, 2000a). The Parliament is the client 
and the auditee is the entity subject to audit. The auditor determines the scope of the audit 
(in the case of performance audits), or it is statutorily prescribed (in the case of financial 
statement audits), and the auditor reports to the client, Parliament. The auditor is not 
placed in a dependent relationship with the auditee.  The ASCPA (1997) argues that in 
the private sector, the primary allegiance of private sector auditors will be to their clients, 
the agencies which select them, pay their bills, and ensure the continuation of the 
services, and not to the shareholders. In the private sector under this arrangement there is 
the appearance of  conflicting roles. The potential dependence of the auditor on the 
auditee,  affects the perceived independence of the audit (English and Guthrie, 2000a).  
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It is the potential affect on independence that causes the dilemma for auditors-general in 
relation to their involvement in probity audits.   In financial statement audits and 
performance audits, auditees have no influence on the conduct of an audit - the client is 
Parliament, the lines of reporting to Parliament are unambiguous, and Parliament  
effectively pays for the audit.  However, in the case of a probity audit, the lines of 
reporting are not closely identified, the auditee, (the agency) is the one to request the 
audit, and the one to pay for the audit.  The auditee and the client are the same in this 
instance.  This raises the potential problem that exists in the private sector that the auditor 
is reliant on the auditee. This then has associated problems  for the perception of the 
independence of the auditor. 
 
The conduct of probity audits by auditors-general pose the dilemma between providing a 
valuable service in terms of public sector accountability and the maintenance of 
independence.  The next section of the paper gives details of a survey that aims to explain 
how the various auditors-general reconcile this dilemma. 
 
METHOD 
 
The Australian public sector is comprised of 8 separate jurisdictions and each has an 
auditor-general.  There are 9 Auditors-General in Australia: the Commonwealth Auditor-
General and one for each of the jurisdictions; New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, 
Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania, South Australia, the Northern Territory and 
Western Australia.   
 
This research was conducted in collaboration with the Queensland Audit Office (QAO).  
A survey was sent to each auditor-general.  A covering letter was issued by the QAO and 
signed by the Queensland Auditor-General.  Each auditor-general responded to the 
request.  The involvement of the Queensland Auditor-General ensured the 100% response  
rate to the survey.   
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Each of the Auditors-General was asked for the details of probity audits conducted 
between 1 July 1994 and the 30 June 1998.  Specifically, information was requested on 
which particular Auditors-General conducted probity audits;4 the number and scope of 
audits performed; the cost of the audits; and the method of reporting the results of the 
audits.  In addition, qualitative comments (through subsequent electronic communication) 
were requested from each Auditor-General who did not perform probity audits. 
 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
All Auditors-General responded to the survey.  The information on who actually 
conducted probity audits during the period of the study is contained in Table 1.   
 
TAKE IN TABLE 1 
 
 
An analysis of the responses from the Auditors-General indicates that four out of the nine 
Auditors-General actually conducted probity audits during the period of the study.  
Auditors-General from the Commonwealth, Queensland, Tasmania and the Australian 
Capital Territory confirmed they have conducted probity audits, while the other five 
Auditors-General did not conduct any.  This provides a mixed picture of the prevalence 
of this type of activity, and it would appear as if Australian Auditors-General are divided 
on the benefits of conducting this type of audit.  However, further analysis of the negative 
responses will indicate why audits were not performed - was it a matter of policy, or was 
it just that they had not been requested to perform this service? 
 
An analysis of the responses from those who did not conduct probity audits is obtained in 
Table 2.   
 
TAKE IN TABLE 2 
 
                                                 
4 The responses will thus include what the Auditors-General themselves classify as probity audits. 
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Table 2 indicates that five of the Auditors-General, those from NSW, Victoria, South 
Australia, West Australia and the Northern Territory all indicated that they don’t conduct 
probity audits.  Moreover they argued that the decision was taken on a matter of policy or 
legislative mandate. For example, in an electronic communication, Mr Iain Summers, the 
Auditor-General of the Northern Territory wrote:  
 
This is both a policy issue by the Executive Government, and a recognition of the 
role of the Auditor-General in the system of Parliamentary democracy. Quite 
appropriately, the Government does not direct the action of the independent 
auditor (19 March, 2001).  
 
On the other hand, the Auditors-General from the Commonwealth, Queensland, 
Tasmania and the ACT have conducted probity audits.  While there is no general 
agreement as to the suitability of public sector auditors’ involvement in providing such 
assurance services, those Auditors-General who do provide such services argue on 
competitive grounds for doing so.  For example, in a submission to the ACAG meeting in 
June 1998, the ANAO argued that:  
 
Requests of this nature demonstrate that the Auditor-General has a reputation for 
providing objective, ‘value added’ advice in the timely manner. It also provides a 
practical opportunity for the ANAO to influence, if necessary, the outcome of a 
process, without compromising the Auditor-General’s independence. 
 
In further elaboration of this point, the ANAO pointed out that they still have the ability 
to decide whether to take on a particular probity audit or not, and if it looks like it is 
going to be controversial then they would not accept the engagement.  
 
With the increasing use of private sector service providers to deliver government 
services, some Auditors-General consider that they should be in a position to offer and to 
respond to a request to conduct probity audits.  This belief flows because of their unique 
place in the accountability chain, and consequently their intimate knowledge "of the 
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parliamentary, executive and public service institutions, interrelationships and 
operations" (Barrett 1996, p145). Further, from a public accountability perspective, the 
opinions emanating from audit offices have a reputation and a credibility that their 
private sector counterparts sometimes lack.  
 
For auditors-general, the decision about whether to engage in probity audits is a question 
of the risks of conducting the audit weighed up against the benefits to be obtained from 
providing such services.  The risks of the audit include the potential risk of  litigation 
associated with the outcomes, but the more substantial risk arises from the potential 
compromise of the auditor-general’s independence.  When asked about this dilemma, one 
senior auditor from the ANAO commented: 
 
It is interesting, because it reflects a view about audits, that they are reactive and 
that auditors add very little value because what they do is they come in and 
criticise a program and so what, the bird has flown.  It is all after the event stuff.  
The conduct of probity audits is our attempt to balance the risks and the benefits 
and say to our auditees if you have got the need for us to come in and work with 
you real time, we can do that. 
 
One of the ways in which to reduce the risks involved is by the reporting process, that is, 
whether the results of probity audits are reported to Parliament. The question of whether 
to report to Parliament or not, again hinges around the independence issue and the 
diminution of the risks of conducting such an audit.  A senior auditor from the ANAO 
told us: 
The risk is handled by reporting to Parliament.  We don’t miss the opportunity to 
do what we are employed for – provide assurance to Parliament.  So we can work 
with an agency, and give an opinion about the process, and suggest ways for 
change, and still report all of the findings, but at the same time we can make sure 
that the project does not go off the rails.  We can achieve both things, that is a 
win—a win for the Audit office and the agency and for Parliament.  At the end 
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you can say to Parliament, because the Audit Office had a place in this process it 
stands up. 
 
Information on the probity audits conducted by the Commonwealth Auditor-General is 
contained in Table 3,the Queensland Auditor General in Table 4, the Tasmanian Auditor-
General in Table 5 and the ACT Auditor-General in Table 6.  
 
TAKE IN TABLE 3 
 
TAKE IN TABLE 4 
 
TAKE IN TABLE 5 
 
TAKE IN TABLE 6 
 
 From the tables it can be seen that the position taken in relation to reporting the results of 
these audits varies considerably. At one end of the spectrum is the position of the 
Commonwealth Auditor-General who always reported his results to Parliament.  In fact, 
the Commonwealth Auditor-General has a policy where the auditee pays for the audit, 
but the ANAO actually pays for the cost of the production of the report to be tabled in 
Parliament. These figures are also reported separately in the annual report.  In terms of 
reporting, each of the other three Auditors-General (the  Queensland, Tasmanian and 
ACT Auditors-General) all had different perspectives on reporting. The Queensland 
Auditor-General included the results of three probity audits in his main reports to 
Parliament. The results of one were covered by management letters, and the explanation 
given for the fifth audit was that it was not reported to Parliament because 'no matters 
were raised during the auditing process'. Neither the Tasmanian or the ACT Auditors-
General reported the results of their probity audit to Parliament. The Tasmanian Auditor-
General argued that it was 'a matter for his discretion' as to the particular course followed, 
while the ACT Auditor-General said that if any adverse findings had been made, they 
would have been reported to Parliament. 
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The picture in relation to the execution of probity audits by Australian Auditors-General, 
and the manner in which the risks associated with their conduct is handled is varied. The 
results of the study indicate that further policy development appears warranted, as it is 
essential that audit offices emerge from the debate as a credible and valued source of 
assurance and advice to the Parliament, to government entities and to the community.  
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
The increasing complexity of arrangements for government service delivery – 
particularly contracting out of public services to private enterprise – and the devolution of 
financial management to line managers, are challenges to public accountability (JCPA, 
1996). Public accountability consists of the public exposure of matters that affect the 
public's perception of government. However, the secrecy in contract negotiations and 
provisions has been a source of frustration for some auditors-general (Funnell 1997; 
Barrett 1996). 
 
It is only when the accountability institutions are operating effectively that matters can be 
brought to the attention of Parliament and ultimately to the people. The auditor-general is 
considered to be an essential part of the accountability chain between the executive, 
agencies, Parliament and taxpayers.  The increasing use of private sector providers and 
privatisations of government organisations has raised the necessity to assure the public 
that processes are properly adhered to. This provides an opportunity for auditors-general 
to fulfill their public accountability obligations, while at the same time providing a 
service that will add value in terms of  public administration.  However, the problems 
posed by these types of activities are that they are ex-ante examinations of processes as 
contrasted with the normal ex-poste activities of auditors-general. Further, because the 
audits are primarily requested by agencies, the appropriate lines of reporting, and the 
involvement of Parliament are less clear than they are in traditional public sector audit 
activities. 
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This paper explores the perceptions of Australian Auditors-General to the conduct of 
probity audits by surveying all auditors-general on their attitudes to probity audits.  The 
study finds that while all auditors-general have acknowledged that the conduct of probity 
audits is not without its risks, some auditors-general have felt that the benefits outweigh 
the risks and hence engage in probity audits, while others feel that the risks outweigh the 
benefits and so they are not prepared to conduct probity audits.   
 
The whole crux of the probity auditing issue is how the threats to independence are 
balanced with the need for the public sector audit function  to ‘stay relevant’. For some 
auditors-general the issue is one of  “adding value” to their product, and casting the 
public sector auditing net "wider than they have in the past" to meet public expectations 
(Barrett, 1996). Those who conduct probity audits argue that they have opportunities both 
to enhance the accountability framework and be a credible contributor to improving 
public administration.  The Commonwealth Auditor-General  argues that auditors-general 
need to be proactive in addressing any perceived 'audit expectations gap'.  They need to 
be flexible, taking proactive stances where necessary, and responding, even anticipating 
change (Barrett, 1996). The public has an inherent trust in the work of the auditor-
general. If that concept of public trust is withdrawn, the operational effectiveness of the 
entity will most likely be impaired. This is the risk for auditors-general and this research 
has provided a window to view the current thinking on this topic. 
 
The research has limitations.  First, there is the time period involved in the study.  
Because the decision to conduct probity audits lies with individual auditors-general the 
current position may have changed in respect to individual jurisdictions.  However, the 
results of the study are indicative of the position in relation to an emerging issue that 
deserves proper and open debate.  The resolution of some of the issues is crucial to the 
relevance of the public sector audit function in a changing public sector and also to open 
and transparent government processes.
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Table I 
Probity Audits Undertaken by the Auditors-General of Australian Jurisdictions from 
1994-1998 
 
          Jurisdiction    Probity Audits 
 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) A total of five probity audits have been  
performed. 
 
Queensland Audit Office (QAO) QAO has carried out five probity audits for 
government agencies in the time period. 
 
Tasmanian Audit Office One probity audit has been performed by this 
Office. 
 
ACT Auditor-General’s Office The Office has conducted one probity audit 
 
NSW Audit Office Auditor-General has not conducted or 
undertaken probity audits.  
 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Office The Office does not perform probity audits 
for government agencies.  
 
Office of the Auditor-General of West  
Australia WA’s Auditor-General Office has not 
conducted any probity audits as an assurance 
service for any government agencies. 
 
SA Auditor-General’s Department The Department has not undertaken probity 
audits as specific activities. 
 
NT Auditor-General Office The Auditor-General has not undertaken any 
probity audits 
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Table II 
Reasons given by Australian Auditors-General for not undertaking Probity Audits 
 
          Jurisdiction    Reason 
 
NSW Audit Office Auditor-General does not conduct probity 
audits as a matter of policy.  
 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Office The Office usually engages private sector 
auditors to undertake probity audits, 
especially in relation to sales of major assets. 
 
Office of the Auditor-General of WA The WA Auditor-General's Office does not 
conduct probity audits, because it does not 
have a mandate to do so. 
 
SA Auditor-General’s Department The Department does not undertake probity 
audits as specific activities since it does not 
have a specific mandate to undertake them. 
As a matter of policy, it does not undertake 
any probity audits unless it has a clear 
legislative mandate. The Department does 
review government procurement processes as 
part of its normal financial attest audit work 
and its review of agencies’ internal controls. 
 
NT Auditor-General Office The Auditor-General has not been requested 
by the Parliament of Northern Territory to 
conduct a probity audit. The NT government 
engages accounting firms to conduct its 
probity audits.5
 
                                                 
5 The Northern Territory contract out all their audits because of lack of personnel (Funnel, 1997). 
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Table III 
Details of Probity Audits Conducted by the Australia National Audit Office 1994 and 
1998 
 
Audit Title Agency Audit Fees Reporting 
Evaluation Process for 
the Shared Systems 
Suite 
Office of Government 
Information 
Technology (OGIT) 
The total cost was 
$87,000, of which 
$55,000 was 
recovered in fee from 
OGIT. The remainder 
($32,000) related to 
cost of reporting to 
Parliament 
ANAO Performance 
Audit  Report No. 14 
(1996-97), presented 
to Parliament 
 
Evaluation Processes 
for the Selection of 
Records Management 
Systems for the 
Commonwealth 
Office of Government 
Information 
Technology 
Total cost was 
$128,850 of which 
$99,500 was 
recovered from OGIT. 
The balance of 
$29,350 was cost of 
reporting to 
Parliament 
ANAO Performance  
Audit Report No. 30 
(1997-98), presented 
to Parliament 
Evaluation Processes 
for the Selection of 
Internet Access 
Services for the 
Commonwealth 
Office of Government 
Information 
Technology 
Total cost ($79,950) 
consisted of an audit 
fee of $50,600 that 
was recovered from 
OGIT and of $29,350 
that related to cost of 
reporting to 
Parliament 
ANAO Performance 
Audit Report No. 30 
(1997-98), presented 
to Parliament 
Evaluation Processes 
for the Selection of 
Hearing Devices 
Department of Health 
and Family Services 
(DHFS) 
Total cost ($142,641) 
of which only $71,962 
was recovered in fees 
from DHFS. The 
$70,679 additional 
cost was the cost of 
reporting to 
Parliament 
 
ANAO Performance 
Audit Report No. 49 
(1997-98), presented 
to Parliament 
OGIT and FedLink 
Infrastructure 
OGIT and Department 
of Finance and 
Administration 
Total cost ($86,902) 
consisted of $38,602 
audit fee which was 
recovered from OGIT 
and of $48,300 cost of 
reporting to 
Parliament 
ANAO Performance 
Audit Report No. 11 
(1998-99), presented 
to Parliament 
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Table  IV 
Details of Probity Audits Undertaken by QAO between 1994 and 1998 
 
Audit Title Agency Audit Fees* Reporting 
Tendering process to 
privatise the 
Queensland Abattoir 
Corporation (1997) 
Department of 
Primary Industries 
 1997 Queensland First 
Report of the Auditor-
General on Audits 
Performed for 1996-
97, page 72. 
Brisbane Cricket 
Ground Trust’s 
Catering Tender 
Process (1997) 
Brisbane Cricket 
Ground Trust 
 1997 Queensland First 
Report of the Auditor-
General on Audits 
Performed for 1996-
97, page 97. 
Tender Evaluation 
and Selection of 
Waste Management 
Contracts at Gold 
Coast City Council 
(1997-98) 
Gold Coast City 
Council 
 Auditor-General’s 
Report to Parliament, 
Audit Report No. 1 
(1998-99), page 17. 
Cairns City Council 
Tendering Process for 
Year 2000 Compliant 
Software (1998)* 
 
*This probity audit 
was conducted by a 
QAO contract auditor, 
Duesburys C A 
Cairns City Council  Two probity audit 
reports were issued as 
management letters to 
Cairns City Council 
by the contract auditor 
Tender Process for 
Provision of Legal 
Services to 
Queensland Health 
(1998) 
Queensland Health  Not reported to 
Parliament 
 
*QAO could not provide this information for confidentiality reasons.
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Table V 
Details of Probity Audits Undertaken by the Tasmanian Audit Office between 1994 and 
1998 
 
Audit Title Agency Audit Fees Reporting 
Provision of Stores 
Inventory and 
Distribution Services 
Royal Hobart Hospital Less than $2000 Report not made to 
Parliament.  
 
 
Table VI 
Details of Probity Audits Undertaken by the ACT Audit Office between 1994 and 1998 
 
Audit Title Agency Audit Fees Reporting 
Independent Audit 
Report ACT Housing, 
Integrated System for 
Information 
Processing (ISIP) 
enhancement/replace-
ment (1998) 
ACT Housing $14,837 cost, but 
client not charged. 
Audit funded as a 
performance audit. 
Result not reported to 
Parliament 
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